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अनुमोदित
In principle, the extent of the right of the owner.
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अनुमोदित
Much more, with stronger reason.
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अनुमोदित
After the manner of.
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अनुमोदित
From table and bed (from ‘board and bed’). It is a term used to describe a partial divorce in a case in which the marriage was just and lawful ; but, for some supervening cause, such as the commission of adultery or cruelty by the husband or wife it becomes improper or impossible for them to live together. The partial divorce was earlier effected by the Ecclesiastical Court. It only caused the separation of husband and wife ; but did not dissolve the marriage so that neither of them could marry during the life of the other. This is now substituted by section 22 of the Indian Divorce Act. Thus, a divorce ‘a mensa et thoro’ has to be distinguished from a regular divorce and also from a divorce ‘a vinculo mariytimonii’, which means a decree for nullity. (R. S. Manual Raju v. Mary Sara AIR 1982 Kar. 235)
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अनुमोदित
(From the effect to the cause) Inductive reasoning; pertaining to the process of reasoning whereby principles or other propositions are derived from observations of facts.
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अनुमोदित
From possibility to reality.
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अनुमोदित
From cause to effect; deductive reasoning; pertaining to the line of reasoning based on specific assumptions, rather than experience.
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अनुमोदित
You must not vary the words of statute.
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अनुमोदित
From the beginning.
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अनुमोदित
From an intestate (Person); Succession to property of a person who has not made a will.
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अनुमोदित
From within.
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अनुमोदित
Without this.
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अनुमोदित
Without such cause.
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अनुमोदित
Plain language does not need an interpretation. (Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1955 SC 504)
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अनुमोदित
There is no harm in being cautious The presumption that Parliament may be presumed not to make superfluous legislation, the presumption is not a strong presumption and the statutes are full of provisions introduced because abundans cautela non nacet (there is no harm in being cautious) (Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of AP AIR 1981 SC 1473)
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अनुमोदित
Judicial or other act performed out of court and not a matter of record.
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अनुमोदित
Commercial acts.
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अनुमोदित
Governmental acts. The test what constitutes an act jure imperii is whether the act in question is of its own character a governmental act, as opposed to an act which any private citizen can perform. It follows that in the case of acts by a separate entity it is not enough that the entity should have acted on the directions of the State, because such an act need not possess the character of a governmental act. To attract immunity, what is done by a separate entity must be something which possesses the character of a governmental act, the entity will not be entitled to state immunity. Likewise, in the absence of such character the mere fact that the purpose or motive of the act was to serve the purposes of the State will not be sufficient to enable separate entity to claim immunity. [see Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Co. [1995] 1 WLR 1147 (HL)]. It is clear, therefore, that— (a) it is first necessary to consider what is the relevant act of the separate entity which forms the basis of the claim of immunity; (b) to qualify for immunity, the act must be govenmental rather than commercial in character; (c) this is a question of the analysis of particular facts against the whole context in which they have occurred; (d) if the act in question is not governmental, the mere fact that the purpose or motive of the act was to serve the purposes of the State will not be sufficient to enable the separate entity to claim immunity. [see In re, Banco Nacional De Cuba [2002] 1 WLR 2039 (Ch.D)/110 Comp. Cas. 889] In the case of a central bank, for example, line between governmental and commercial acts is difficult to be drawn, since the role of a central bank is necessarily to exercise a role over financial and economic activity. The authorities have held that : (1) The issue of letter of credit by a central bank is a commercial act [Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529 and Hispano Americana Mercantil SA v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1979] 2 Llyod’s Rep 277]; (2) The issue of bank notes is a governmental act [Camdex International Ltd. v. Bank of Zambia (No. 2) [1977] 1 WLR 632, 636, F-G]; (3) The regulation and supervision of nation’s foreign exchange reserves is an aspect of Government’s sovereign function of regulating the monetary system and is governmental [Crescent Oil and Shipping Services Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Angola (unreported) 28 May, 1999 Cresswell J., applying De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua (1985) 770 F 2d 1385]; (4) The issue of promissory note by a central bank is a commercial activity [Cardinal Financial Investments Corpn. v. Central Bank of Yemen affirmed by Court of Appeal (2001) Lloyd’s Rep Bank 1].
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अनुमोदित
An action; the right of suing before a judge for what it is due; also proceedings or a form of procedure for the enforcement of such right.
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अनुमोदित
A personal right of action dies with the person. When he dies, the suit should abate. (Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 253.) The maxim is applicable only when the action is one for damages for a personal wrong. It has no application in a suit for property. (Kakumanu Pedasubhayya v. Kakumanu Akkamma AIR 1958 SC 1042.) The expression, thus, operates in a limited class of actions ex delicto such as action for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not assuming the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory - Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain AIR 1967 SC 1124.
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अनुमोदित
The burden of proof lies on the plaintiff or the prosecution (Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat AIR 1964 SC 1563).
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अनुमोदित
A deed; a physical result of human conduct.
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अनुमोदित
It means that an act of court shall prejudice no one. (See Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia AIR 1988 SC 2031.) No acts of court should harm a litigant and it is the bounden duty of a court to see that if a person is harmed by mistake of the court, he should be restored to the position he would have occupied but for that mistake. (Jung Singh v. Brijlal [1964] 2 SCR 149.) The maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’ connotes that it is not only within the power, but a duty as well, of Court to correct its own mistakes in order to see that no party is prejudiced by a mistake of the Court. The earlier decision could not however be reviewed on the application of the said maxim. This maxim has very limited application and it cannot be availed of to correct or review specific conclusions arrived at in a judicial decision. The Court cannot exercise any inherent powers for setting right any injustice that may have been caused as a result of an earlier order of the Court. While alive to the consideration that “the highest court in the land should not, by technicalities of procedure, forge fetters on its own feet and disable itself in cases of serious miscarriages of justice”, it has, nevertheless, come to the conclusion that “the remedy of the appellant, if any, is by recourse to Article 137 and nowhere else”. Situations can and do arise where the Court may be constrained to recall or modify an order which has been passed by it earlier and that when ex facie there is something radically wrong with the earlier order, the Court may have to exercise its plenary and inherent powers to recall the earlier order without considering itself bound by the nice technicalities of the procedure for getting this done. Where a mistake is committed by a subordinate court or a High Court, there are ample powers in the Supreme Court to remedy the situation. But where the mistake is in an earlier order of Supreme Court, there is no way of having it corrected except by approaching Supreme Court. Sometimes, the remedy sought can be brought within the four corners of the procedural law in which event there can be no hurdle in the way of achieving the desired result. But the mere fact that, for some reason, the conventional remedies are not available should not render Supreme Court powerless to give relief. As pointed out by Lord Diplock in Issacs v. Robertson [1984] 3 All ER 140, it may not be possible or prudent to lay down a comprehensive list of defects that will attract the ex debito justitiae relief. Suffice it to say that the court can grant relief where there is some manifest illegality or want of jurisdiction in the earlier order or some palpable injustice is shown to have resulted. Such a power can be traced either to Article 142 of the Constitution or to the powers inherent in Supreme Court as the Apex Court is the guardian of the Constitution. It is, however, indisputable that such power has to be exercised in the “rarest of rare” cases. There is great need for judicial discipline of the highest order in exercising such a power, as any laxity in this regard may not only impair the eminence, dignity and integrity of Supreme Court but may also lead to chaotic consequences. Nothing should be done to create an impression that Supreme Court can be easily persuaded to alter its views on any matter and that a larger Bench of the Court will not only be able to reverse the precedental effect of an earlier ruling but may also be inclined to go back on it and render it ineffective in its application and binding nature even in regard to subsequent proceedings in the same case.
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अनुमोदित
The act of God prejudices no one. The law does not hold a man to a legal duty where he is prevented from performing it by an act of God. Act of God means an accident or event which happens independently of human intervention and due to natural causes, such as storm, earthquake, etc., which no human foresight can provide against, and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility; an event leading to a property loss caused by forces of nature that could not have been prevented by reasonable care or foresight. This maxim is not applicable to a mere ‘inevitable accident’ where the duty is imposed by the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher ([1868] LR 3 HL 330). A man may contract so as to be bound to pay damages if he fails to do what is, or becomes, impossible. Recently, the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (AIR 1987 SC 1086.) held that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortuous principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
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अनुमोदित
An act in law shall prejudice no man
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अनुमोदित
The act of law injures no one
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अनुमोदित
The act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with the guilty intent (see mens rea)
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अनुमोदित
Such result of human conduct as the law seeks to prevent
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अनुमोदित
At another day
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अनुमोदित
To hear
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